


## LESSON 3

### Controls During Use

Classified documents are, of course, most vulnerable to unauthorized access when they are out of their storage containers. In this lesson, we'll consider the protection of classified documents while they are being used. We'll discuss the suitability of work areas, get into employee monitoring of documents, go over security checks, and wind up with control of visitors.

#### OBJECTIVES



"CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS ARE, OF COURSE, MOST VULNERABLE TO UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS WHEN THEY ARE OUT OF THEIR STORAGE CONTAINERS".

When you have completed this lesson, you should be able to do the following:

- Ensure that areas where personnel work with classified documents are suitable.
- Apply the rules for safeguarding classified material during use.
- Make security checks.
- Ensure that arrangements for classified visits to your facility are properly made and that the visits are properly conducted.

## CLASSIFIED WORK AREAS



Edwin "Buzz" Meyerhofszen  
Chief Engineer



Bascom Lightfoot  
Engineer




Kate Cogbill-Lightfoot  
Engineer


You will need to decide on the places in your facility where authorized personnel can use classified material. Your layout may already lend itself to such use, or it may be necessary to shift office assignments. In some cases, partitions and doors may have to be introduced. In considering whether an area is suitable, ask two basic questions:

- Can the area be *closed off* (by partitions, doors, window coverings, etc.) so that unauthorized persons cannot see the classified material while it is being used or overhear classified discussions?
- Are all persons assigned to the *area-authorized persons*? That is, are they all appropriately cleared and do they all have a need-to-know?

Your Field Office and especially your I.S. Rep will help you to make specific determinations for your facility.

Nowadays at EWC, all classified work is conducted on the third floor in three adjoining offices. There's Zelda's windowless corner office. Next door is Buzz's office, and adjoining it is the office shared by engineers Bascom Lightfoot and his wife, Kate Cogbill-Lightfoot, both of whom have SECRET clearances and a need-to-know for the Laser Widget Project.






Buzz took the ACME reference material to his office and closed the door to the hallway behind him. There was a tall building across the street, and Buzz looked out his window to see if "friendly Fred," whose window was directly across from his, was looking out. Sure enough, there he was, waving his arm off at Buzz. Buzz gave a brief wave in return, and then dropped the blinds.

## MONITORING THE MATERIAL


### 1. CONSTANT SURVEILLANCE



### 2. COVERED IN PRESENCE OF UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS



### 3. RETURNED TO STORAGE CONTAINERS




Buzz began to read the ACME material. He knew that under **NISPOM, 5-100**, "individuals are responsible for safeguarding classified information entrusted to them" and that "the extent of protection afforded classified information shall be sufficient to reasonably foreclose the possibility of its loss or compromise."

At EWC, Harold had drawn up three rules to implement this provision of the NISPOM. During use at EWC, classified material is to be

- Kept under the constant surveillance of an authorized person who is in a physical position to exercise direct security controls over the material.
- Covered, turned face down, placed in storage containers, or otherwise protected when unauthorized persons are present.
- Returned to storage containers as soon as practical when not in use.

Let's see how this works. As Buzz was reading, there was a knock at his door. He opened it to find Eloise Jiggets, the assembly line supervisor for EWC's main product, the unclassified QZ-12 electric widget. Eloise said that the redesigned widget stuffer was squashing the widgets. Buzz asked her in and immediately turned the ACME material face down since Eloise was not an authorized person. After a brief discussion of the stuffer problem, Buzz realized that he would have to go to the assembly line area to observe the squashing. He called




in Kate Cogbill-Lightfoot and asked her to look after the ACME material while he went with Eloise. Since Kate is an authorized person (properly cleared with a need-to-know), it was perfectly all right for Buzz to pass on the surveillance responsibility for the ACME material to her.

## SECURITY CHECKS

The **NISPOM, 5-102** requires that you make end of day security checks to ensure 1) that all classified material has been properly stored, and 2) that the security container (or area) has been secured.

We recommend that you consider making room or area checks during normal working hours as well to ensure that employees are keeping classified material *under surveillance* or *storing* it properly. Though not required, such checks foster good security habits. So circulate. Get out of your office. Drop in. Look around.



"HAROLD HUXTABLE THRIVED ON  
SECURITY CHECKS"


Harold Huxtable thrived on security checks. When he learned from Zelda that Buzz had checked out the ACME material, he went straight to Buzz's Office. Without knocking he opened the door. There was no one in the office! He went to Buzz's desk and saw some papers turned face down. He turned them over and saw the cover sheet. But before he could say, "Aha!" Kate Cogbill-Lightfoot snatched the papers from his hand. "What's going on?" asked Harold. "Where's Buzz?" Kate explained Buzz's absence. Then she said that she had become so excited reading the ACME material, that she had gone to her office to discuss some fine points of thermo-coupled inertial guidance with Bascom. "But," she said, I didn't take my eyes off the ACME material for a moment." Harold argued that since Kate was in the next room she was not in a physical position to

exercise *direct* security controls over the material. "Ha!" said Kate, holding the ACME material at arm's length overhead. "I got it before you could read it, didn't I?" Harold conceded the point, but said that in the future it would be best to take the material with her when she went next door. "If it's with you," he said, "you'll be able to concentrate on your discussion with Bascom." Kate was mollified. "All right," she said. "I will."

## PERIMETER CONTROLS


We're only going to mention perimeter controls, because they need to be carefully tailored to the circumstances of each facility. The gist of the requirement (see **NISPOM, 5103**) is that you must have a system to keep employees and visitors from bringing classified material into or taking it from your facility without proper authority. Your I.S. Rep can help you set up a system that suits your situation.

## CONTROL OF VISITORS



The measures you establish to control visitors to your facility should ensure that visitors who are authorized access to classified information are not needlessly delayed and that other visitors are effectively denied such access.


Before getting into visitor control, let's briefly review how contract related and non-contract related visits are arranged. (These are discussed in detail in our subcourse **Essentials of Industrial Security Management**.) With a *contract related* visit there is a contractual or prospective contractual relationship between the facility proposing to send the visitor and the facility to be visited. The FSO of the sending facility sends a visit authorization letter to the receiving facility, and the latter determines that the sending facility has



an appropriate FCL. If the receiving facility does not object, the sending facility sends the visitor.

With a *non-contract related* visit, there is no contractual relationship between the facilities. The facility that will be disclosing classified information must obtain approval from the User Agency having jurisdiction over the information. The FSO of the facility to be visited then verifies the FCL level of the sending facility with the DIS-CVA. If the receiving facility does not object, the sending facility sends the visitor.

Let's go through a non-contract related visit to EWC. Both EWC and ACME Aeronautics are working on a new weapon system, the Laser Widget Project for the Navy. EWC's contract with the Navy is for research and development (R & D) of the widget. ACME has a separate contract with the Navy to develop a guidance system for the widget. There is no classified contractual relationship between EWC and ACME; therefore, although their separate efforts have been closely coordinated from the outset of the project, visits between them are non-contract related.




As a part of this close coordination, ACME had planned to send Linwood Crigger, ACME's chief engineer, on a classified visit to EWC to meet with EWC's engineers (Buzz, Bascom, and Kate). In seeking the approval of the Navy GCA, both Harold and ACME's FSO had pointed out to the Navy GCA that classified information held by each company for the Laser Widget Project was to be disclosed. The Navy GCA had given its approval. Harold also received the visit authorization letter from ACME. Harold verified ACME's FCL with the DIS-CVA. DIS-CVA told Harold that ACME's FCL was at the SECRET level as was its safeguarding capability. Harold made a record of the verification. Since EWC did not object to the visit, Harold made no reply to the visit authorization letter. (In the area of visits, the NISP's general rule is "silence means consent.") The date set for the visit in the authorization letter was today,

November 29, and Harold awaited Mr. Crigger's arrival. So did Buzz, Bascom, and Kate.

**Verify Visitor's Identity.** Before a visitor is allowed access to classified information, the visitor's identity must be verified. Acceptable identification contains both *name* and *photo*, such as the visitor's driver's license or company photo I.D. card. If there is any doubt about the visitor's identity, check with the contractor or UA activity that sent the visit authorization letter. When Mr. Crigger arrived for his visit, Becky Womble, EWC's receptionist, verified his identity. She then notified Harold, who came to the reception area and took Mr. Crigger to Zelda's office.

**Make a Record of the Visit.** Your facility must keep a record of the visit that includes the following:

- **Visitors full name,**
- **Name of the contractor or activity that the visitor represents, and**
- **Date of the visit.**




What sort of record should you keep? There are three main options: the *visit authorizations letter* itself, a *record for classified visits* only, or a *combined record* of both classified and unclassified visits.

- **Visit Authorization Letters.** This is the simplest way to meet the requirement. Since two *of* the required pieces *of* information (visitor's name and name *of* the contractor/activity that the visitor represents) are already on the visit authorization letter, all that must be added (e.g., on the back *of* the letter) is the date *of* the visit. (For the entire contents *of* a visit authorization letter, see **NISPOM, 6-103.**) This is the method EWC uses. Harold introduced Linwood to Zelda, and she wrote on the back of the visit authorization letter, "November 29, 1995."

- **Classified Visit Record.** Some facilities prefer to keep a separate record of all classified visits. If you have many classified visits, listing them in a separate register lets you tell at a glance what classified visits you have had. Be sure that the three required items are recorded for each entry (visit).
- **Combined Visit Record.** Still other facilities choose to keep a record of all visits, both classified and unclassified, indicating which visits were classified and which were not. Again, be sure that the three required items are also recorded for each **classified visit**.

(Note that, whatever type of record you make, the record does not have to show whether the visitor did or did not actually gain access to classified information during the visit.)



"MAKE YOUR POLICIES AND PROCEDURES CLEAR TO THE VISITOR"

**Brief the Visitor.** While at your facility, the visitor must comply with your SPP, if you have one. So go over the procedures that the visitor will be expected to follow. For example, if the visitor is from a facility that does not possess classified information (an "access elsewhere" facility), show the visitor how to protect classified documents during use. Will you permit the visitor to make a record of classified discussions? Will you allow photo-taking in areas where classified information might be recorded on the film? Make your policies and




procedures, which must accord with the NISPOM, clear to the visitor.

Harold told Linwood that EWC did not allow visitors to make a record of classified discussions and that photo taking was not permitted.

**Control the Visitor's Movements.** You must provide an escort for the visitor when in areas where classified information may be subject to unauthorized disclosure. When needed, the escort must be an appropriately cleared employee who has been informed of the access limitations or restrictions on the visitor's movements. Otherwise, the rule is that you must control the movement of visitors so that they "are only afforded access to classified information consistent with the authorized purpose of the visit" (**NISPOM, 6-106**). This requirement holds true for all contract related and non-contract related visits. For example, if the visitor only needs to see certain classified documents, you could provide access to them in your classified reading area (if you have set up one) or at a desk in a suitable office area. If the visitor is there to see a specific employee, then that employee can be made responsible for monitoring the visitor's access. That's what Harold did. He took Linwood to Buzz's office and introduced him to Buzz. (Buzz had fixed the stuffer.) Harold reminded Buzz of the purpose of Linwood's visit and of the areas of the project that were to be discussed. Then Harold left.

Buzz called in Bascom and Kate, introduced them, and then the four engineers set to work in the closed-off office. As part of EWC's performance on its R & D contract, EWC was developing an unclassified prototype of the laser widget. Although the prototype was unclassified, certain test results for it were classified SECRET. During the discussions, it became clear that



ACME would need the test results in order to calibrate its guidance equipment. It was decided that EWC would prepare a report, classified SECRET, and send a copy of the report to ACME. After discussing several other matters of mutual concern, the engineers said goodbye. Then Buzz took Linwood to the front door, wished him a safe trip, and said they must all do this again some time.


**Recover All Classified Material.** Make sure that all classified material is recovered from **the visitor when the purpose** of the visit has been accomplished or, for visits of more than one day, at the close of business each day.

**Visits by I.S. Reps.** I.S. Reps and representatives of certain other federal investigative and security agencies are authorized to visit your facility without having given you advance notice of their intent to visit (*see NISPOM, 6102*). When the representative presents proper credentials, you would grant the representative access to classified information to the minimum required. If you have doubts about the representative's identity, level of clearance, or need-to-know, contact the agency or activity concerned and verify these matters.

## SUMMARY

Care must be taken to ensure that work areas deter unauthorized access to classified information. While in use, classified information must be kept under proper surveillance, protected from the view of unauthorized persons, and returned to storage after use. End-of-day security checks must be made to ensure that classified material has been properly stored and that the security container has been secured. For classified visits, the visitor's identity is verified, a record is made, the visitor is briefed, the visitor's movement is controlled, and all classified material in the possession of the visited facility

is recovered. I.S. Reps and certain other representatives of the federal government are granted access to classified material to the minimum required upon presentation of proper credentials. Such credentials must be verified if there is doubt as to the visitor's identity, clearance level, or need-to-know.



# 3 Review Exercises

Complete the following exercises for review and practice. *Multiple-choice questions may have one or more correct choices.*

1. What are the two basic considerations (questions to be asked) in determining whether an area is suitable for classified work?

a. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

b. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

2. Correct this statement: "During use, classified material at EWC will be

- Kept under the occasional surveillance of an appropriately cleared person who is in a psychological state to exercise implicit security controls over the material,
- Reversed, turned sideways, placed on nearby chairs, or otherwise jumbled when uncleared persons are present, and
- Replaced in desk drawers as soon as possible after use."

3. End-of-day security checks must be conducted at the close of each w\_\_\_\_\_ d\_\_\_\_\_ to ensure that:
- a. all classified material has been p\_\_\_\_\_ s\_\_\_\_\_ .
  - b. the s\_\_\_\_\_ c\_\_\_\_\_ has been secured.
4. Before a visitor can be permitted access to classified information, the visitor's i\_\_\_\_\_ must be v\_\_\_\_\_ .
5. Check the three types of information that any record of a visit must contain.
- ☐ a. Job title/position of visitor.
  - ☐ b. Visitor's full name.
  - ☐ c. Date and place of birth of visitor.
  - ☐ d. Date of the visit.
  - ☐ e. Name and title of person(s) visited.
  - ☐ f. Visitor's clearance level.
  - ☐ g. Name of the contractor or activity that the visitor represents.
  - ☐ h. Whether or not the visitor accessed classified information.
6. The visited contractor determines whether to allow a visitor to make a record of classified discussions and whether to permit a visitor to take photographs in areas where classified information might be recorded on the film.
- ☐ True ☐ False
7. Visitors' movements must be controlled so that the visitors are only afforded access consistent with the authorized p\_\_\_\_\_ of the visit.

8. One day a man came to EWC and presented credentials indicating that he was a representative of the Naval Investigative Service. Harold had never met the man before, and EWC had not received a visit authorization letter for his visit. The man said he wanted to inspect certain SECRET documents pertaining to the Laser Widget Project. What should Harold have done?

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1. a. Can the area be closed off so that unauthorized persons cannot see the material while it is being used?  
b. Are all persons assigned to the area authorized persons?

(p. 3-2)

2. During use, classified material at EWC will be

- Kept under the ~~occasional~~ <sup>constant</sup> surveillance of an ~~appropriately cleared~~ <sup>authorized</sup> person who is in a ~~psychological state~~ <sup>physical position</sup> to exercise ~~implicit~~ <sup>direct</sup> security controls over the material,

- ~~Reversed~~ <sup>Covered</sup>, turned ~~sideways~~ <sup>face down</sup>, placed ~~on nearby chairs~~ <sup>in storage containers</sup>, or otherwise ~~jumbled~~ <sup>protected</sup> when ~~uncleared~~ <sup>unauthorized</sup> persons are present, and

- ~~Replaced in desk drawers~~ <sup>Returned to storage containers</sup> as soon as ~~possible~~ <sup>practical</sup> after use.  
(p. 3-3) (NISPOM, 5-102)

3. working day, properly stored, security container. (p. 3-4) (NISPOM, 5-104)

4. identity, verified. (p. 3-6, 7) (NISPOM, 6-108)

5. b, d, and (p. 3-7) (NISPOM, 6-110)

6. True. (p. 3-8) (NISPOM, 6-106)

7. purpose. (p. 3-10) (NISPOM, 6-106)

8. Harold contacted the Naval Investigative Service and verified the representative's credentials, clearance level, and need-to-know for the Laser Widget Project. He then permitted the representative access to the SECRET information. Since EWC normally annotates visit authorization letters for use as visit records, and since there was no such authorization letter for this visit, Harold simply recorded the three essential items of information on a sheet of paper and filed it with the other visit records.

(p. 3-10) (NISPOM, 6-102)